When Did I Begin? investigates the theoretical, moral, and biological issues surrounding the debate over the beginning of human life. With the continuing controversy over the use of in vitro fertilization techniques and experimentation with human embryos, these issues have been forced into the arena of public debate. Following a detailed analysis of the history of the question, Reverend Ford argues that a human individual could not begin before definitive individuation occurs with the appearance of the primitive streak about (...) two weeks after fertilization. This, he argues, is when it becomes finally known whether one or more human individuals are to form from a single egg. Thus, he questions the idea that the fertilized egg itself could be regarded as the beginning of the development of the human individual. The author also differs sharply, however, from those who would delay the beginning of the human person until the brain is formed, or until birth or the onset of conscious states. (shrink)

Ford, Norman M Throughout history Catholics held the commonly accepted views of the times regarding human reproduction, and these views changed as advances were made in scientific knowledge. Hence, it would be best to begin with Aristotle's views on human reproduction.

Ford, Norman M Doctors and nurses understand the personal dignity of their patients and their natural desire to be healthy and happy. The aged with failing memories or mental impairments are persons whose dignity and moral worth remain intact. They also know patients differ in their personal circumstances, their faith, their stages of life's journey and their attitude to sickness and approach of death. This awareness enables them to adequately perform their valuable professional services from a subject centred (...) perspective as well as from an objective approach based on our shared rational human nature. All this needs to be re-affirmed for patients, especially the aged, those living with post coma unresponsiveness, Alzheimer's disease and any other unconscious state. (shrink)

In The Ethics of Food, Gregory E. Pence brings together a collection of voices who share the view that the ethics of genetically modified food is among the most pressing societal questions of our time. This comprehensive collection addresses a broad range of subjects, including the meaning of food, moral analyses of vegetarianism and starvation, the safety and environmental risks of genetically modified food, issues of global food politics and the food industry, and the relationships among food, evolution, and human (...) history. (shrink)

After twelve years as the inaugural Director of the Caroline Chisholm Centre for Health Ethics, leading Melbourne bioethicist Dr Norman M Ford has resigned his position. Instead of contemplating retirement however, the tireless septuagenarian, who is also a philosopher, author, Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy and Bioethics at Monash University and Catholic Salesiah priest, has his sights set on tackling even more controversial biomedical issues as an independent research scholar and author. Georgina Hall gets an (...) insight into his life’s work. (shrink)

Background: Informed consent is regarded as a contract between autonomous and equal parties and requires the elements of information disclosure, understanding, voluntariness and consent. The validity of informed consent for critically ill patients has been questioned. Little is known about how these patients experience the process of consent.Objective: The aim of this study was to explore critically ill patients’ experience with the principle of informed consent in a clinical trial and their ability to give valid informed consent.Design: 11 stroke patients (...) who had been informed about thrombolytic treatment and had been through the process of deciding whether or not to participate in a thrombolysis trial went through repeated qualitative semistructured interviews.Results: None of the patients had any clear understanding of the purpose of the trial. Neither did they understand the principles of randomisation and voluntariness. Reasons for giving or not giving consent were trust, conceptions of benefits and risks and altruism. Several patients found it immoral to involve patients in the consent procedure and argued that this was the doctors’ responsibility. Others argued that it is a duty to question patients and perceived it as a sign of being treated with respect and dignity. A majority of the patients found the consent process vague and ambiguous.Conclusions: The results indicate that the principle of informed consent from critically ill patients cannot be seen as a contract between equal and autonomous parties. Further studies are needed to explore critically ill patients’ experiences with the process of informed consent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 187 Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): An Introduction. By JOHN MARENBON. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987. Pp. xi, 230. $35.00. Later Medieval Philosophy (LMP), the sequel to John Marenbon's 1983 Early Medieval Philosophy 480-1150 (EMP), aims to be not a historical account of later medieval philosophy but an " introduction... intended... to help " the reader " begin his own study of the subject (...) " (p. 1). To this end "Part One examines the organization of studies in medieval universities, the forms of writing and techniques of thought, the presuppositions and aims of thirteenth- and fourteenthcntury scholars. Part Two examines in detail the way in which some important later medieval thinkers discussed a difficult and central question : the nature of intellectual knowledge" (p. 1). Marenbon justifies his two-fold approach in the "Conclusion to Part One: What is Medieval Philosophy? " (pp. 83-90). Surveying three current approaches to medieval philosophy, Marenbon notes (1) a ' separationism ' between philosophy and theology provoked by ' rationalists ' like V. Cousin and B. Haureau and preserved in Catholic philosophical circles by such exponents as Fernand von Steenberghen; (2) a view that agrees " that it is right to consider the history of medieval philosophy as a separate subject from the history of medieval theology; but it is a philosophy which, nonetheless, depends on Christian revelation and cannot be understood in abstraction from certain funda· mental tenets of the faith," viz. that of Etienne Gilson who maintains the existence of a 'Christian philosophy'; and (3) the 'modern analytic approach' advocated by Norman Kretzmann and others in the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy ("to end the era in which it has been studied in a philosophical ghetto"). The third ap· proach de-emphasizes " the theological context " of " the particular philosophical arguments they isolate " and " the origin and literary form of texts " (p. 87) to " concentrate on the philosophical problems which they believe they share with medieval scholars " and " to translate medieval texts so far as possible into modern terms..." (pp. 8687 ). The arguments for these three approaches, however, are "based, not on historical evidence about medieval attitudes to philosophy, hut on different conceptions of what philosophy should he" (p. 88). These hermeneutical presuppositions affect the selection and arrangement of evidence by the various sorts of historian. Marenhon offers a fourth approach: ' historical analysis ', which " aims both to bridge the distance between the interests and assumptions of a modern reader and 188 BOOK REVIEWS the writings of later medieval thinkers, and yet to take account of it " (p. 89). Two restrictions are involved; historical analysts must not make " anachronistic assumptions about the identity of the problems discussed in their texts" (p. 89) and must restrict the scope of their investigations " to a single topic (or a set of individual topics) " rather than" writing... comprehensive Histories" (p. 90). Marenhon seems to recognize that there may he " patronizing " ways to take account of the difference between " medieval scholars " and " ourselves " hut such " limitations " are inescapable " conditions of disciplined thought " (p. 191). Fortunately Marenhon has moved away from the parochial assumption governing his Early Medieval Philosophy "that any thinker who appeared to share the methods and interests of ·modern British philosophers was a philosopher, and that all other thinkers were theologians, mystics, poets, scientists or whatever, hut not philosophers." He now holds "that there is no single, identifiable subject-' philosophy'which has been studied from Plato's time to the present day" (EMP, 1988 rev. ed., p. vii). Thus, Marenhon does not explicitly entertain the grand thesis that all or the most important forms of medieval philosophy are actually superior to all or the most important kinds of modern philosophy to justify the importance of studying medieval philosophy today (cf. Leo Strauss, Philosophie und Gesetz). Instead Marenhon, noting that " philosophia has a wide range of reference " (LMP, p. 66) and tacitly assuming that philosophy is an important activity, focuses on the problem of intellectual knowledge. The selection of exactly this problem, however, is not incompatible with the view that the epistemological turn characteristic of modern philosophy is still taken as normative. Accordingly, Marenhon provokes in us such questions as, Is philosophy today as good as philosophy in the hands... (shrink)

In books on the calculus of probability, there have been many accounts as to what is the meaning of the term “probable.” We can readily divide them into three groups. The first sometimes defines probability in terms of the ratio between the number of cases favorable to an event and the number of equally possible cases. Sometimes probability is defined in some way other than this, but the above formulation, or one similar to it is used to describe the “measure (...) of probability.” This concept is what is called “the classical concept” of probability and was held by the great workers in the field of probability from the beginning of the eighteenth and opening of the nineteenth centuries, including James Bernoulli, Thomas Bayes, and the Marquis de Laplace. The second conceives of probability as a logical relation between hypothesis and evidence. Following this conception, one could identify “probability” with “degree of confirmation.” We will term this the “logical concept.” The third group identified probability with the relative frequency with which a property occurs in a specified class of elements. We will call this the “frequency concept.”. (shrink)

Problems related to the operator form of the generalized canonical momenta in quantum mechanics are resolved by use of the general quantum mechanical canonical point transformation method. This method can be applied to any general canonical point transformation irrespective of the relationship between the domains of the original and transformed variables. The differential representation of the original canonical momenta pi in the original coordinate space is −i $\begin{array}{*{20}c} / \\ h \\ \end{array}$ ∂/∂x i and of the transformed canonical momentap (...) i ′ in the transformed coordinate space is −i $\begin{array}{*{20}c} / \\ h \\ \end{array}$ ∂/∂x i ′. Relationships are derived between the eigenvalues of the original and transformed momenta in either space. The ordering problem for general point transformations is discussed and is shown to be solved. As an example of the generality of the method, it is demonstrated on the point transformation in three dimensions from Cartesian rectilinear to spherical rectilinear coordinates. (shrink)

This is an advanced study of systems of propositional logic which offers a comprehensive account of a wide variety of logical systems and which encourages students to take a critical stance towards the subject. A great variety of systems and subsystems are defined and compared as regards their deductive power and relation to their model theory. Interesting features include a more refined treatment of modal logic and the special attention given to the weakenings of classical logic. Useful appendices provide a (...) topical bibliography and review of basic set theory. (shrink)

Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will (...) was addressed in a religious context. According to orthodox views in the West, God was claimed to be omniscient (and hence in possession of perfect foreknowledge) and yet God was supposed to have given humankind free will. Attempts to solve the apparent contradiction often involved attributing to God special properties, e.g. being 'outside' of time. However, the trouble with such solutions is that they are generally unsatisfactory on their own terms. Even more serious is the fact that they leave untouched the problem posed not by God's foreknowledge but that of any human being. Do human beings have foreknowledge? Certainly, of at least some events and behaviors. Thus we have a secular counterpart of the original problem. A human being's foreknowledge, exactly as would God's, of another's choices would seem to preclude the exercise of human free will. Various ways of trying to solve the problem – e.g. by putting constraints on the truth-conditions for statements, or by 'tightening' the conditions necessary for knowledge – are examined and shown not to work. Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized, and remedied, the problem evaporates. (shrink)